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Abstract
We describe the behaviour of a monopolist supplying a vertically di¤erentiated
good with network externalities. Assuming a …xed cost of quality improvements,
we show that the presence of network externalities enhances the incentive to
expand output associated with scale economies. Although the quality distor-
tion operated by the monopolist increases with network externalities, the output
expansion e¤ect is dominant, so that the welfare loss due to monopoly power
shrinks as the role of network externalities in determining consumers’ satisfac-
tion becomes more relevant.
J.E.L. Classi…cation: D62, L12, L52
Keywords: monopoly, quality distortion, network externalities, market cover-
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1 Introduction
The case for or against regulating a monopolist supplying goods whose production
involves a large amount of …xed costs and a negligible unit variable cost, has
been long debated, and it is now being re-assessed concerning markets where
consumer utility is characterised by network externalities, i.e., it is positively
related to the number of consumers who purchase the same good.1 However, to
our knowledge, the interplay between network externalities and the monopolist’s
choices concerning product quality and the output level, has not been evaluated
so far.
Our aim is to provide a theoretical framework apt to address this issues. We
shape a monopoly model where quality improvements hinge upon …xed costs,
which can be thought of as the R&D e¤ort. In the existing literature on vertical
di¤erentiation, the case of variable convex costs has been widely investigated.
The main question is whether a monopolist supplies the socially optimal quality,
or distorts it so as to induce self-selection on the part of consumers. The earliest
contributions (Spence, 1975; Sheshinski, 1976) deal with a single-product monop-
olist. Their main conclusions are that (i) for a given output level, quality is over
or undersupplied by the monopolist as compared to social planning, depending
on whether the marginal valuation of quality is above or below the average val-
uation of quality (if they coincide, the monopolist supplies the same quality as
the social planner); and (ii) the monopolist undersupplies quality if his output is
close to the socially optimal one.
Several other contributions investigate a continuous model where the monop-
olist supplies a range of qualities, with a technology analogous to that assumed
in Spence (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Itoh, 1983; Maskin and Riley, 1984; Besanko,
Donnenfeld and White, 1987). This literature highlights that, in order to dis-
criminate among buyers with di¤erent characteristics, the monopolist increases
the slope of the price-quality gradient compared to the social optimum. This is
achieved by o¤ering a quality range broader than the one that would be avail-
able under social planning or perfect competition. This points to the adoption of
Minimum Quality Standards to correct quality distortion (Besanko, Donnenfeld
and White, 1987).
To our knowledge, the role of …xed costs in shaping the behaviour of a mo-
nopolist, has received scanty attention, a relevant exception being Gabszewicz
et al. (1986).2 In their paper, however, …xed costs are exogenously given, and
therefore do not a¤ect the optimal choice of quality.
1Seminal contributions in the theory of network externalities are Katz and Shapiro (1985;
1986); Farrell and Saloner (1985; 1986). For an overview, see Katz and Shapiro (1994) and the
special issue of the International Journal of Industrial Organization, edited by Economides and
Encaoua (1996).
2The opposite holds in the …eld of oligopoly competition. See Ronnen (1991), Motta (1993),
Lambertini (1997), Lehmann-Grube (1997) and Scarpa (1998), inter alia.
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We adopt a model where a single-product monopolist supplies a good whose
production entails a …xed cost convex in the quality level, and consumers’ utility
function contains a network externality component. We evaluate the monopolist’s
performance against the social optimum in a general setting where the monop-
olist, in response to the presence of network e¤ects, may over or under supply
product quality as compared to the social optimum.
Resorting to a speci…cation of the model where the distribution of consumers
is uniform and the cost function is quadratic, it is possible to ascertain that the
monopolist always undersupplies product quality and, as long as the market is
only partially covered, such distortion is increasing in the extent of network ex-
ternalities. The latter …nding seemingly points to the need for quality regulation.
However, this does not imply that we either could or should aim at increasing the
intensity of competition in such a market, for several reasons. First of all, it is well
known that, when production involves …xed costs, a competitive market structure
cannot obtain (Shaked and Sutton, 1982; 1983). Second, the presence of brand-
speci…c network externalities disrupts the conventional monotonic relationship
between the number of …rms on one side and consumer surplus and social welfare
on the other. As a consequence, the appropriate comparison has to be carried out
between a pro…t-seeking monopolist and a public …rm maximising social surplus.
We show that (i) the monopoly output and social welfare are increasing in the
extent of network externalities; and (ii) the social planner serves all consumers
independently of network externalities. These facts lead to a relevant conclusion,
namely, that when the level of network externalities is non-negligible, the welfare
loss due to monopoly power decreases as network externalities increase. To the
extent that our assumptions are acceptable, our analysis implies that, in indus-
tries where the utility each individual derives from purchase is strongly related
to the number of consumers patronising the same good or brand, the case for
regulation is much weaker than what we usually think according to conventional
wisdom.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model. A
speci…c formulation is introduced in section 3, where we derive both the monopoly
equilibrium and the social optimum, which are then comparatively evaluated in
section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a monopoly market for a good whose utility depends both on intrinsic
characteristics, which are represented by quality q, and by the amount of market
demand x. Consumers are characterised by parameter µ, which represents the
individual marginal willingness to pay for quality:3 they are distributed with
3As emphasised by Tirole (1988, ch. 2), µ may also be interpreted as the reciprocal of the
marginal utility of money. This implies that µ increases as income increases, and conversely.
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density f (µ) over the interval [¹µ¡ 1; ¹µ], with ¹µ ¸ 1: The number of individuals is
normalised to 1. Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good, the resulting
net surplus being:
U = max fµq + ®x¡ p ; 0g (1)
where p is the price charged by the monopolist, while ® (the same for all the
agents) is a positive coe¢cient representing the weight of the network externality
in the utility function. Let bµ (®; p; q; f (µ)) de…ne the marginal willingness to pay
of the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying and not buying:
bµ (®; p; q; f(µ)) ´ (µ : µq + ® Z µ
µ
f(z)dz ¡ p = 0
)
: (2)
Then, market demand is
x =
Z µ
µ
f(µ)dµ where µ = max
n
¹µ ¡ 1 ; bµo : (3)
Whenmax
n
¹µ ¡ 1; bµo = bµ; partial market coverage obtains; whenmaxn¹µ ¡ 1; bµo =
¹µ ¡ 1; full market coverage obtains, i.e., x = 1. Consumer surplus is
CS =
Z µ
µ
U(¢)f(µ)dµ : (4)
On the supply side, production involves a …xed cost C = C(q); with C 0; C
00
>
0: Variable costs are assumed away. This amounts to saying that quality is the
result of R&D e¤orts, whose cost is increasing in the quality level, while it is
unrelated to the scale of production. The pro…t function is then
¦M = p ¢
Z µ
µ
f (µ)dµ ¡ C(q) : (5)
Obviously, social welfare is SW = ¦M+CS: Following Spence (1975), we evaluate
the social incentive to modify product quality, in correspondence of the monopoly
optimum. We prove the following:
Proposition 1 Given f(µ); in the monopoly optimum where
@¦M
@q
= 0; the
derivatives
@CS
@q
and
@SW
@q
may have either sign under partial market cover-
age.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The above proposition states that, in response to the presence of network
e¤ects, the monopolist may over or under supply product quality as compared to
the social optimum.
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3 A model with quadratic costs and uniform distribution
In order to characterise in detail the in‡uence of network externalities on the
provision of quality and welfare, we investigate a version of the model which
is widely adopted in the existing literature. In particular, we assume that (i)
C(q) = q2; and (ii) the population of consumers is uniformly distributed over
[¹µ ¡ 1; ¹µ]: Recall that the marginal consumer is characterised by a willingness to
pay µ^ = (p¡ ®¹µ)=(q ¡ ®), so that under partial market coverage (pmc) and full
market coverage (fmc); respectively, market demand is
x = ¹µ ¡ p¡ ®
¹µ
q ¡ ® =
q¹µ ¡ p
q ¡ ® for all fp; q; ®g such that µ^ 2 (
¹µ ¡ 1; ¹µ]: (pmc) (6)
x = 1 for all fp; q; ®g such that µ^ · ¹µ ¡ 1: (fmc) (7)
In either case, the monopoly pro…t function is ¦M = px¡ q2:
3.1 Pro…t maximization
In this section, we …rst treat separately the alternative settings of partial and full
market coverage. Then, we proceed to establish the parameter ranges where the
monopolist adopts, alternatively, one regime or the other.
3.1.1 Partial market coverage
Suppose µ^ 2 (¹µ¡1; ¹µ]: Then, partial market coverage obtains and the monopolist’s
pro…ts are given by:
¦pmcM = p
q¹µ ¡ p
q ¡ ® ¡ q
2 (8)
This expression has to be maximized with respect to the two choice variables:
price and quality.4
The …rst order condition with respect to price is:
@¦pmcM
@p
= ¹µ +
®¹µ ¡ 2p
q ¡ ® = 0 (9)
which leads to p = µq=2. Plugging this expression for p in (8) and taking the
derivative with respect to q yields:
@¦pmcM
@q
=
¹µ
2
q
2(q ¡ ®) ¡
¹µ
2
q2
4(q ¡ ®)2 ¡ 2q = 0 (10)
4The same results obviously follow from the maximisation of pro…ts with respect to quantity
and quality.
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The quality level provided by the monopolist is therefore:5
qpmcM = ®+
¹µ
2
+ ¹µk
16
(11)
where k =
q
¹µ
2 ¡ 32®: Clearly, the admissible range for ® is [0; ¹µ2=32]: We will
show below that the upper bound of this interval is never binding. The following
result can be established:
Lemma 1 The optimal monopoly quality and price under partial market coverage
are everywhere decreasing in ®:
Proof. Taking the derivative of (11) and simplifying, we get
sign
Ã
@qpmcM
@®
!
= sign
³
k ¡ µ
´
= sign (¡32®) (12)
which is negative for all ® 2 [0; ¹µ2=32]: To prove that ppmcM is also everywhere
decreasing in ®; it su¢ces to observe that ppmcM = µq
pmc
M =2.
The equilibrium price simpli…es to ppmcM = µ
3
=16¡ ¹µ(¹µ2 ¡ 16® ¡ ¹µk)=32; and
market demand is xpmcM = ¹µ=2 + 8®=(¹µ + k): The resulting equilibrium pro…t is
¦pmcM = (3¹µ¡ k)(16®+¹µ2+¹µk)2=(256(¹µ+ k)): Obviously, in the limit, as ® tends
to zero, these results coincide with those derived in the standard model without
network externalities, q¤M = ¹µ
2
=8; p¤M = ¹µ
3
=16 and x¤M = ¹µ=2 (see Lambertini,
1997). For any strictly positive ®, it is easy to see that ppmcM is always lower than
p¤M , while x
pmc
M is greater than x
¤
M : In particular,
Lemma 2 The monopoly output under partial market coverage is everywhere
increasing in ®:
Proof. Taking the derivative of xpmcM ; we get
@xpmcM
@®
=
8(¹µ ¡ 16® + ¹µk)
k(¹µ + k)2
> 0 ; (13)
being ¹µ ¡ 16®+ ¹µk > 0 for all acceptable ®:
Notice that, unlike what happens in the variable cost case without network
externalities (Spence, 1975), as long as the monopolist does not serve the whole
market, a distortion is observed both in quality and in quantity. Positive network
5Second order conditions are met throughout the calculations performed in the paper, al-
though they are omitted for the sake of brevity.
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externalities increase the quality distortion made by the monopolist, who supplies
a lower quality at a lower price, so as to expand the output level in order to serve
lower income consumers. The welfare implications of these distortions can be
traced out calculating the level of consumer surplus (CS) and the level of social
welfare (SW ):
CSpmcM =
¹µZ
µ^
(µqpmcM + ®x
pmc
M ¡ ppmcM )dµ =
(16®+ ¹µ
2
+ ¹µk)3
128(¹µ + k)2
(14)
SW pmcM =
(16® + ¹µ
2
+ ¹µk)2[(3µ ¡ k)(µ + k) + 2(16® + ¹µ2 + ¹µk)]
256(¹µ + k)2
(15)
In the admissible range of ®, it can be shown that
@¦pmcM
@®
> 0 ;
@CSpmcM
@®
> 0 ;
@SW pmcM
@®
> 0 : (16)
The above inequalities can be given the following interpretation. Pro…ts increase
with the weight of network externalities, because the positive e¤ects of output
expansion and quality reduction outweigh the negative e¤ect due to the reduc-
tion of price. On the other hand, consumer surplus becomes larger as network
externalities increase, because the bene…cial e¤ects of price reduction and output
expansion more than o¤set the loss due to a lower product quality. Furthermore,
observe that @2SW pmcM =@®
2 > 0 and @2¦pmcM =@®
2 < 0; considered together, these
derivatives imply @2CSpmcM =@®
2 > 0:
3.1.2 Full market coverage
In this case, pro…ts write simply¦fmcM = p¡q2. Since pro…ts are always increasing
in price, the monopolist always chooses the highest price compatible with full
market coverage, given by:
¹p(q) = (¹µ ¡ 1)q + ® (17)
Therefore, the monopolist chooses the quality which maximizes ¦fmcM = (¹µ¡1)q+
®¡ q2: The …rst order condition is:
@¦fmcM
@q
= ¹µ ¡ 1¡ 2q = 0; (18)
yielding optimal quality qfmcM = (¹µ ¡ 1)=2: The price set by the monopolist is
pfmcM = ¹p(qM ) = (¹µ ¡ 1)2=2 + ®: Therefore, we can state
Lemma 3 The optimal monopoly price under fmc is everywhere increasing in
®:
Social welfare at equilibrium amounts to:
SW fmcM = ®+
¹µ(¹µ ¡ 1)
4
: (19)
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3.1.3 Partial vs full market coverage
The monopolist’s pro…ts under partial market coverage are the following:
¦pmcM =
(3¹µ ¡ k)(16®+ ¹µ2 + ¹µk)2
256(¹µ + k)
(20)
while, under full market coverage, pro…ts are:
¦fmcM = ®+
(¹µ ¡ 1)2
4
(21)
The monopolist chooses to serve all the market only if ¦fmcM > ¦
pmc
M , and the
conditions under which this inequality holds involve the values of ® and ¹µ: The
following holds:
Proposition 2 ¦fmcM ¸ ¦pmcM and fmc obtains, in the following parameter re-
gions:
² µ 2 [1; 4=3] and ® ¸
µq
µ(4 + µ)3 ¡ µ2 ¡ 6µ ¡ 4
¶
=8:
² µ > 4=3 and ® ¸ max
n
0; (3µ ¡ µ2 ¡ 2)=4
o
.
In the remainder of the space
n
µ; ®
o
; the opposite holds and pmc obtains.
Observe that the boundaries
µq
µ(4 + µ)3 ¡ µ2 ¡ 6µ ¡ 4
¶
=8 and (3µ¡µ2¡2)=4
are both below ¹µ2=32 for all ¹µ: This entails that the condition for the reality of
qpmcM is never binding.
The above proposition has the following relevant corollaries
Corollary 1 For all ® 2 [(5p5 ¡ 11)=8; 1=16], the monopolist’s optimal output
is non-monotone in µ:
The proof follows immediately from the observation that the monopolist may
be induced to serve all consumers even if the marginal willingness to pay for
quality is relatively low, provided that the network e¤ect is su¢ciently large to
compensate for a low valuation of quality.
The market coverage policy chosen by the monopolist in the space fµ; ®g is
described in …gure 1, where the domain of µ is to the right of the dashed line at
µ = 1.
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Figure 1 : Full vs partial market coverage under monopoly
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The e¤ects of both ® and ¹µ on the optimal quality can now be described. The
following holds:
Proposition 3 For all µ 2 [1; 4=3); optimal monopoly quality, price and output
are discontinuous in ®; along ® =
µq
µ(4 + µ)3 ¡ µ2 ¡ 6µ ¡ 4
¶
=8: For all µ 2
[4=3; 2]; optimal monopoly quality, price and output are continuous in ®; along
® = (3µ ¡ µ2 ¡ 2)=4. Optimal quality is monotonically increasing in ¹µ and non-
increasing in ®:
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
3.2 Welfare maximization
A benevolent social planner maximizes social welfare with respect to price and
quality. As is well known, network externalities being absent, the planner would
price at marginal cost, serving all consumers. Consequently, any positive ® can
be expected not to a¤ect the planner’s output decision. Indeed, given (1), the
standard solution of the …rst order conditions relative to welfare maximization
leads to the following value of µ^:
8
µ^ =
¡2®(8® + ¹µ2 + ¹µk)
¡3®¹µ + ¹µ3
4
+ ®k +
¹µ
2
k
4
: (22)
It can be easily shown that this value is negative for every ® > 0: This means
that the social planner would choose a price and a quality such that the market
is more than totally served, which of course cannot be the case. Therefore, we
impose full market coverage (x = ¹µ ¡ µ^ = 1) from the outset. In such a case,
social welfare is
SW = ¹µq + ® ¡ q
2
¡ q2 : (23)
The …rst order condition is:
@SW
@q
= ¹µ ¡ 2q ¡ 1
2
= 0 : (24)
Therefore, qSP = (2µ ¡ 1)=4: Social welfare in equilibrium is SWSP = ®+ [¹µ(¹µ¡
1)]=4 + 1=16, which is obviously larger than SW fmcM ; the di¤erence amounting
to 1=16. In order to guarantee full market coverage, the price cannot be higher
than (17). Substituting qSP into (17) yields ¹p(qSP ) = (2¹µ
2 ¡ 3¹µ+1)=4 +®: Since
social welfare does not depend on the price level, the social planner can choose
any p 2 [0; ¹p (qSP )]: The di¤erence ¹p(qSP )¡ p simply implies a transfer in favour
of consumers. This result also implies that, as it usually happens when some
kind of externality is involved, welfare maximization does not require marginal
cost pricing.
4 Monopoly vs social planning
We are now in a position to compare the choices of the social planner with
those of the monopolist under both market coverage regimes, within the model
investigated in the previous section. We can state the following:
Proposition 4 The optimal monopoly quality is always lower than qSP : More-
over, the di¤erence qSP¡qpmcM is increasing in ®; for all ® such that the monopolist
chooses partial market coverage.
Proof. Consider …rst the case where the monopolist covers the market entirely.
We have that qSP ¡ qfmcM = 1=4; i.e., the di¤erence between the two quality
levels is positive and independent of both ® and µ: Second, in the case where the
monopolist covers the market only partially, observe that, if ® = 0; qpmcM = q
¤
M =
µ
2
=8 < qSP for all µ 2 [1; 2]: Then, from lemma 1, we know that @qpmcM =@® < 0 in
the admissible range for ® and µ: This su¢ces to prove the proposition.
We can conclude that, also in the case of full market coverage, the monopolist
undersupplies quality, setting a price which can be lower than the price the social
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planner would choose: providing a higher quality, the social planner can set a
price which is (¹µ¡ 1)1
4
higher than pM , being still able to satisfy the full market
coverage condition (17).
The comparative evaluation of social welfare in the two cases is summarised
in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Independently of the extent of market coverage, SWSP > SWM
for all admissible ® and µ: However,
² Whenever the monopolist serves all consumers, SWSP ¡ SW fmcM = 1=16:
² Whenever the monopolist covers the market only partially, then SWSP ¡
SW pmcM is non-monotone both in ® and in µ:
Proof. The result that SWSP > SWM for all admissible ® and µ is fairly
intuitive, because, for any pair f®; µg; the social planner can at least replicate
the monopolist’s performance in terms of social welfare. Comparing SWSP with
SW pmcM over the parameter space ® 2 [0; 1=16]; µ 2 [1; 2]; the surface SWSP ¡
SW pmcM appears as in …gure 2, which conveys the following information: (i) for
any admissible ®; the di¤erence SWSP ¡ SW pmcM is non-monotone in µ; (ii) when
® is close to 0 and µ is close to 1, the di¤erence SWSP ¡ SW pmcM is increasing in
®; while the opposite happens in any other region of the parameter space f®; µg:
Figure 2 : Welfare di¤erence, social planning vs monopoly (® 2 [0; 1=16]; µ 2
[1; 2])
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The non-monotonicity observed in both cases is to be traced back to the
behaviour of social welfare under monopoly. To ascertain this, notice that the
derivative of SWSP w.r.t. either ® or µ is linear, while the derivative of SW
pmc
M
w.r.t. the same parameters is a convex curve. They cross at a value of the
relevant parameter which belongs to its admissible interval. Suppose that ® and
µ are alternatively …xed at an appropriate value. This allows us to plot the two
social welfare levels in two dimensions, obtaining in both cases a picture like
…gure 3.
Figure 3 : Comparative welfare assessment
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As we already know, this picture obtains either (i) if we let µ vary, given any
arbitrary ® 2 [0; 1=16], or (ii) if we let ® vary, provided that µ is close to 1.
The above discussion has some relevant implications as to the scope for reg-
ulation when consumer preferences are characterised by network externalities.
First, from …gure 2 it clearly appears that (i) SWSP ¡ SW pmcM is single-peaked
in µ for any given ®; with a global maximum at (µ = 1:675; ® = 0); and (ii)
excluding the region where the network externality and the marginal willingness
to pay are both close to the lower bounds of their respective admissible inter-
vals, any increase in ® reduces the welfare loss imputed to the monopolist. The
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straightforward corollary to this result is that, as long as the monopolist does not
serve all consumers, the argument for regulation generally becomes weaker as the
extent of network externalities increases.
5 Discussion and concluding remarks
According to the current antitrust legislation, both in Europe and in the US, the
case for the intervention of the legal authorities arises whenever competition is
threatened or already eliminated, regardless of any welfare considerations. The
foregoing analysis sheds some new light on the amount of welfare loss and the
resulting need for public intervention in a monopoly market for a product whose
network externalities are a relevant component of consumer’s utility. A discus-
sion on these issues is currently taking place regarding the market for mobile
telephones (in Europe) and the software industry (in the US). The US Depart-
ment of Justice’s case against Microsoft6 focusses upon the behaviour of Microsoft
to preserve and extend its monopoly power in the software industry. Speci…c al-
legations concern
(1) monopolization of the market for PCs operating systems;
(2) anti-competitive bundling of the Microsoft Internet browser with the Win-
dows OS;
(3) anti-competitive contractual arrangements with various vendors of related
goods.
The foregoing analysis sheds some light on point (1) above, under two re-
spects. First, the existence of network externalities may entail that monopoly
is not so evil as one usually thnks. When production technology involves high
development costs, the presence of network externalities enhances the incentive
towards output expansion associated with decreasing average cost. On the other
hand, the quality distortion operated by the monopolist increases as the weight of
network externalities increases. However, on the aggregate, the output expansion
e¤ect dominates the quality distortion, yielding as a result that the welfare loss
due to monopoly power shrinks as the role of network externalities in determining
consumers’ satisfaction becomes more relevant. Second, the externality entails
that the market be completely served in the social optimum. This produces a
relevant implication, namely, that marginal cost pricing is not a necessary con-
dition for welfare maximization. Hence, marginal cost should not be taken as a
benchmark to evaluate the pricing policy of Microsoft.
6For an exhaustive account of the related debate, see the web page
http://raven.stern.nyu.edu/networks, by Nicholas Economides.
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Ever since the Sherman Act (1890) was passed in the US, according to the
established wisdom on anti-competitive behaviour, any attempt at monopolis-
ing a market should be prosecuted, in that it evidently involves a welfare loss.
Although the correct interpretation of the Sherman Act is still a matter of de-
bate, a widely accepted view is that its main economic goal was to minimise the
deadweight loss due to monopoly power (Bork, 1966).7 Basically, this position
provides the background for the legal action against Microsoft.8 In summary, the
existing antitrust laws prompts for the intervention of legal authorities whenever
there is evidence of abuse of a dominant position, under the presumption that
monopoly power necessarily implies a signi…cant deadweight loss. However, what
appears as an abuse of dominant position might well be the outcome of endoge-
nous mechanisms characterising markets with large network externalities, which
may jeopardise the existence of a competitive or at least oligopolistic equilibrium
(see Lambertini and Orsini, 1998).
Obviously, the above considerations are not fully conclusive. In the model
we have considered here, the output expansion e¤ect jointly exerted by scale
economies and network externalities clearly goes in the direction of a welfare
increase, but it must be taken into account that a di¤erent preference structure
might alter the results signi…cantly. In particular, preference for variety may play
a decisive role. This is emphasised by Church and Gandal (1992), who investi-
gate how the provision decision by software …rms determines whether multiple
hardware technologies can coexist in the market, or whether standardization ob-
tains, with only one hardware technology supplied with software in equilibrium.
They show that when consumers place a high value on software variety there is
a suboptimal amount of standardization by the market.
Another relevant issue is that, in several markets, consumers generate bene…ts
from the purchase of at least two components (again, an important example
is the software-hardware industry, or bundling of di¤erent softwares). In such
cases, the intertemporal distribution of purchases becomes crucial. If a single
…rm is the unique supplier of all components, two issues must be tackled, namely,
7This is reinforced in Section 3 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (1914), which prohibits
those practices that have the e¤ect of binding a consumer to a particular supplier, “where the
e¤ect” of such practices “may be substantially to lessen competition”, i.e., the Congress of
the US meant to prohibit any behaviour that could interfere with the opportunity for equally
e¢cient rivals to compete (Fox, 1981).
8The route taken by the European Community to shape its competition policy is somewhat
the same as in the US, but the Treaty of Rome contains a paragraph which …nds no correspon-
dence in the US antitrust law. Article 85, paragraph 2, establishes that a business strategy
should be neither prohibited nor prosecuted if it “contributes to improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers
a fair share of the resulting bene…t, and which does not ... a¤ord ... the possibility of elimi-
nating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question”. This entails
that the European Community competition policy is not aimed at maximising social welfare,
de…ned as the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus.
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multiproduct pricing and intertemporal pricing. If more than one …rm operates
in the market, then switching costs become relevant as well (see Klemperer, 1992,
1995; Beggs and Klemperer, 1992; Farrell et al., 1998, inter alia).
Finally, goods characterised by network externalities may well be durable
goods, and there arises a need for modelling the intertemporal choices of both
producers and consumers (see Cabral, Salant and Woroch, 1998; Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1998).
For these reasons, future research should produce a deeper understanding of
these phenomena in order to design appropriate policy interventions in industries
where network externalities are a relevant feature.
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Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1. Consider …rst the monopoly optimum under
partial market coverage, i.e., whenmax
n
¹µ ¡ 1; bµo = bµ ´ nµ : µq + ® R µµ f (z)dz ¡ p = 0o.
The relevant …rst order condition is:
@¦M
@q
= ¡p ¢ f (bµ) ¢ bµ0q + p0q ¢ Z µbµ f(µ)dµ ¡C 0 = 0; (a1)
where bµ0q = @bµ (®; p; q; f(µ)) =@q and p0q = @p=@q: As quality increases, the loca-
tion of the marginal consumer shifts in a way determined by:
bµ0q = p0qx¡ C 0
pf (bµ) ; (a2)
where
sign
nbµ0qo = sign np0qx¡ C 0o : (a3)
Di¤erentiating social welfare w.r.t. quality yields
@SW
@q
=
@¦M
@q
+
@CS
@q
=
@¦M
@q
+
Z µbµ
³
µ ¡ ® ¢ f (bµ) ¢ bµ0q ¡ p0q´ f (µ)dµ + (a4)
¡
"bµq ¡ p + ® ¢ Z µbµ f (µ)dµ
#
¢ f (bµ) ¢ bµ0q :
In the monopoly optimum, @¦M=@q = 0, and the above expression simpli…es to:
@SW
@q
=
@CS
@q
=
Z µbµ
³
µ ¡ ® ¢ f(bµ) ¢ bµ0q ¡ p0q´ f(µ)dµ + (a4’)
¡
hbµq ¡ p + ®xi ¢ f (bµ) ¢ bµ0q :
which can be rearranged as:
@CS
@q
=
Z µbµ
³
µ ¡ p0q
´
f(µ)dµ ¡
³bµq ¡ p´ ¢ f(bµ) ¢ bµ0q ¡ 2®x ¢ f (bµ) ¢ bµ0q : (a5)
Observe that, when ® = 0; expression (a5) concides with the well known condition
in Spence (1975). The presence of network externalities adds the last term where
® appears explicitly, and modi…es the other terms as well.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the …rst statement in proposition 3.
Observe that, for µ 2 [1; 4=3); xpmcM < 1 along ® =
µq
µ(4 + µ)3 ¡ µ2 ¡ 6µ ¡ 4
¶
=8:
This goes along with an analogous discontinuity in quality and price. To prove the
second statement in proposition 3, it su¢ces to check that xpmcM = 1; p
pmc
M = p
fmc
M
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and qpmcM = q
fmc
M along ® = (3¹µ ¡ µ2 ¡ 2)=4; which is the relevant boundary
between pmc and fmc for all µ 2 [4=3; 2]: To prove the third statement, consider
…rst qfmcM : This is increasing in ¹µ and invariant in ®: As to q
pmc
M ; we know from
lemma 1 that @qpmcM =@® · 0 for all ® 2 [0; µ2=32]: Moreover, we have
@qpmcM
@µ
=
µ
µ +
q
¹µ
2 ¡ 32®
¶2
16
q
¹µ
2 ¡ 32®
; (a6)
which is positive for all ® 2 [0; µ2=32]: Notice that such interval contains the
region where pmc obtains. This concludes the proof.
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